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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. M. SCOVILLE, 
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The first and second ground stated by the Company 
for a directed verdict are general and in ~ubstance state 
only that the plaintiff failed to prove a pr!ma facie case; 
. . . 
and that a verdict of no cause of action should be granted. 
The first two grounds are necessarily. included in the 
third ground or conversely the third ground merely lends 
specification to the fi:rst two grounds. The . tr~al_ j~_dg~ 
granted a motion to strike parole evidence as being in 
violation of the 1948-1949 \\r-ritings. The trial judge then 
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directed a verdict of no cause of action without specifying 
grounds for the verdict. The granting of the motion to 
strike the evidence in effect held that the 1949 writing set 
out the contract of Mr. Sco:ville and the Company. It fol-
lows that the affirmative defenses were not ruled upon. 
However, as the Company has raised the questions of the 
. affirmative defenses in its brief, the lack of merit in the 
· Company's defenses will be po~inted out in the argument 
to follow. 
I. 
WHERE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUBSTANTIATE A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION 
WAS MADE TO AN ACCOUNT AND THE REBUTTAL OF 
ANY PRESUMPTION OF ACCURACY OF AN ACCOUNT IT 
WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELY-
ING ON AN ACCOUNT STATED AS A DEFENSE TO AN 
ACTION ON A CONTRACT. 
II. 
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PAYMENT 
OF AN AMOUNT ADMITTED TO BE DUE WAS MADE UPON 
THE CONDITION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH PAY-
MENT SHOULD BE IN FULL SATISFACTION OF ALL 
CLAIMS, IT WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE 
PARTY RELYING UPON PURPORTED ACCORD AND SATIS-
FACTION AS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION ON A CON-
TRACT. 
III. 
WHERE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE 
TO WRITING PURPORTED TO BE CONTRACT, AND ELE-
MENTS OF ESTOPPEL WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE, IT WAS 
ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELYING 
UPON ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT THE CONTRACT OF THE 
OTHER PARTY. 
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I. 
WHERE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUBST.ANTIATE A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION 
\VAS ::\IADE TO AN ACCOUNT AND THE REBUTTAL OF 
ANY PRESUl\IPTION OF ACCURACY OF AN ACCOUNT IT 
WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELY-
ING ON AN ACCOUNT STATED AS A DEFENSE TO AN 
ACTION ON ... -\ CONTRACT. 
~Ir. Scoville testified as to protests made as to the 
1949 writing (R. 28, 61, 62, 71, and 72). Such protests 
were made to nir. vVilliams and to Mr. Borswn. These 
protests were made subsequent to th~ 1949 writing. In 
January 1950 nir. Borsum stated to Mr. Scoville that 
:Jir. Scoville should go along with the 1949 writing. If 
Mr. Scoville complained to higher-ups in the comp·any, 
Mr. Borsum, Mr. Scoville, and Mr. Williams would all 
~ 
lose their jobs. On January 30, 1950, the Company sent 
a check accompanied with a statement which statement 
reflected a sum equal to the sum stated on the check and 
setting out the word "Bonus." This check was returned 
to the Company for the purpose of having all withholding 
tax taken out which was done. The Company attempts to 
rely upon this statement as an account stated upon the 
ground that l\Ir. Scoville would not protest such state-
ment for quite some ti1ne. vVhere an account is received 
and no protest is made within a reasonable time, a pre-
suinption arises that such account is an agreed account. 
This presun1ption of accuracy is rebuttable. The prior 
protest of Mr. Scoville, his illness, his fear of losing his 
job, and his consideration for the loss of jobs by other 
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facts which should have been submitted to the jury for the 
purpose of determining whether or not Mr. Scoville made 
protest within a reasonable time. The conversations Mr. 
Scoville had regarding the $2 per ton credit for 1949, his 
protests regarding the 1949 writing, the fact that he was 
ill during February and March of 1950, the fear of losing 
his job, and the fact that nothing more could be done by 
Mr. Scoville other than leave the ~ervice of the company 
at .considerable financial loss to him and his age which 
would act as a detriment to him in obtaining a new job 
should have gone to the jury as evidence of rebuttal as 
evidence of accuracy of the account. There was no evi-
dence of actual assent to the 1949 writing. It was error 
for the trial court to direct a verdict on the ground that 
there was an account stated between Mr. Scoville and the 
Company. 
In WM. F. GOD·BE v. BRIGHAM YOUNG, 1 Utah 
55, the plaintiff advanced goods to the defendant of the 
value of $10,020.27. On February 12, 1856, an account 
was rendered to the plaintiff by the defendant for said 
sum to which the· defendant made no objection. On May 
30, 1868, the defendant paid the plaintiff the sum of $5000. 
The plaintiff claimed judgment for the balance. The de-
fendant in his answer denied an account stated. 
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and the 
defendant appealed. While other grounds were assigned 
as error, this honorable court at page 58 states: 
'·r:rhe Court was correct in charging the jury 
that if the defendant did not object ':vithin a rea.-
sonable tiine to an account pre sen ted to hin1, his 
assent 1nay be prestuned, and 'vill support a.n ac-
._l 
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tion upon an account stated; and also·tha.t, 'If 
"~hen an account is rendered no objection is made 
to it, it is to be considered liquidated from the time 
it is rendered.' ('Vaiden v. ·sherburne, 15 Johns., 
409; Hall v. Morrison, 3 Bosw. 520; Case v. Hotch-
kiss, 3 Abb. N. S. 381; Hutchinson v. Bank, 48 
Barb., 302; Crane v. Hardman, 4 E. D. S·mith, 448; 
Bainbridge v. vVilcocks, Baldw., 536-3rd Circ. 
Pa.), 
The Godbe case was affirmed as to the account stated 
and was reversed on a question regarding interest pay-
ments and other matters not determinative in this action. 
(82 US 250, 15 Wall562). 
In BENITE'S v. HAMPTON, (Utah, 1884), 3 Utah · 
369, plaintiff brought an action on an account stated for 
goods sold and delivered. Plaintiff at the time of trial 
did not establish that the defendant was a party to the· ac-
count or grounds upon which the defendant was to be 
held· or the time which the defendant held the account 
without protest. This honorable court held that it was 
correct not to submit the case to the jury. In so holding, 
the court set out the rule regarding the failure to p·rotest 
an account within a reasonable time. 
At page 373, this honorable court stated: (See follow-
ing). 
'~The effect of an account state·d is to establish 
prima facie the a.ccuTacy of the balance found du·e 
· without other proof. The burden of proving that 
an account is stated or settled is upon the party 
making such allegation; but it is not always neces-
sary in proving an account stated to show an ac-
tual examination of the items of account or de-
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mands of the respective parties thereto, or that 
there has been an express assent or agreement on 
the part of the party sought to be held liable upon 
an alleged account stated that it is correct. This 
may be implied from circumstances. If an account 
be presented for payment by one party thereto to 
the other, and the other party, upon an examina-
tion of it and after a reasonable time has elapsed, 
makes no objection to it, it may be legitimately 
presumed that he was satisfied with it as pre-
sented, and this presumption is so strong that a 
suit can be maintained upon the account as an ac-
count stated, without proof other than that the ac-
count was presented with a demand for payment, 
that reasonable time and opportunity have passed 
since its presentation for a proper examination 
of it, and to make objections to it if there be any: 
Lockwood v. Thorne, 11 N.Y. 170. The same rule 
applies where a party to an account sends for pay-
ment to the other, by mail; if the party to whom it 
is sent does not, after a reasonable time has 
passed, express any objection to it, his silence un-
explained is an implied admission that he has. none, 
that the account is correct, and truly thought not 
conclusively stated: Terry v. Sickels, 13 Cal. 427. 
"But it is not an estoppel; its effect is to es-
tablish prima facie the accuracy of balance due 
as stated in the account without further proof: 
Lockwood v. Thorne, 18 N~Y. 285." 
In BURRASTON v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF· 
NEPHI,· (Utah, 1900) 22 Utah 328, plaintiff brought an 
action to recover a sum of money alleged to be due the 
plaintiff on deposits of money made with the defendant 
betwe·en 1886 and 1894. Defendant alleged an account 
stated. The plaintiff during the period in question made 
6 
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numerous deposits, issued numerous checks and signed 
notes charged against the account. The bank from time 
to time sent statements to the plaintiff showing the condi-
tion of the accolmt and returning the cancelled checks and 
notes 'vhtch "'\vere paid. During the entire period no ob-
jections to the account as reflected by the statement were 
made; nor did the plaintiff challenge the validity or gen-
uineness of the checks and notes so returned. 
After the account "\vas closed and final statem·ent ren-
dered, the plaintiff and one Hague went to the defendant's 
place of business for the purpose of examining the ac-
. count. After such examination, plaintiff made the state-
nlent to the president of the bank that the account was 
"all right." Subsequent to the examination with Hague 
the plaintiff returned to the bank with an attorney for the· 
purpose of examining the account. After this second 
examination, the attorney expressed himself as being 
satisfied .with the account and stated th.at it was all right. 
The plaintiff made no objection for nearly three years 
after he received the itemized account. 
At page 337, the court stated : 
I 
"The record shows that the notes and checks 
in question when paid were returned to Burr aston, 
many of which were handed to him in person by 
the cashier at different times, and others were 
trans1nitted to hirn through the mail; and on no 
occasion did he rnake any objection to or challenge 
the validity of the notes so paid by him or the 
checks issued against his account that we~e paid, 
eaneelled and sent or handed to him by the bank. 
rrhis, coupled with the fact that he received from 
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his account while he was doing business with the 
bank, to which statements he made no objections 
and offered no corrections, together with the fur-
ther fact that after he ceased doing business with 
the bank, he received an itemized statement of all 
the different transactions, including those relating 
to the notes, he had with the bank, to which state-
ment he made no objection for more than three 
years after its receipt by him, we think was; at 
least prima facie proof of the execution of the 
notes and· the issuing of the checks in question 
by Burra.ston. We are of the opinion and so hold 
that the books, notes and checks were properly 
admitted in evidence. 
"Counsel for defendant contend that there 
was an account stated between the pa_rties which 
completely ended plaintiff's right of action. We 
have made a critical examination of the record 
and are decidedly of the opinion that the evidence 
conclusively showed that there was an account 
stated. There was no conflict in the evidence on 
this point. In fact the testimony of Burraston 
tended to support this theory of the ~se. 
"Defendant's motion for a non-suit, made at 
the conclusion of the testimony for plaintiff, and 
after he had rested his case, should have been 
granted, as he failed to make out a prima facie 
case against the defendant." 
In this case the Company attempts to assert failure 
to object by Mr. Scoville which at most would give rise 
to a presumption of correctness as was held in the Burras-
ton, supra, regarding establishing the correct of the notes 
and checks. 
Mr. Scoville did not go over his account with the 
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Company and state it was .. all right" as Burraston stated 
in the Burraston case, supra. Mr. Scoville did not go 
over the Company's books with his attorney to the satis-
faction of the attorney. 
There may have been agreement between the parties 
as to tonnages, but agreement as to tonnages would not 
operat~ to foreclose a question as to the credit per ton as 
the settlement of the credit was not within the contempla-
tion of the parties. 'Salt Lake Engineering Works v. 
Utah Concrete Pipe Co., (1916) 49 Utah 53, and Eagle 
Lumber Co. v. Burton Lumber Co., (1923) 62 Utah 491. 
In l C.J .S., secti.on 37, page 715 
"Retention for an unreasonable time, without 
objection, of a statement of an account rendered 
showing the net balance due prima facie shows 
assent to its correctness and, therefore, is prima 
facie evidence of an account stated. Assent to the 
correctness of a statement of accounts is ordinar-
ily ilnplied from failure to object to it within a 
reasonable time, and, in the absence of extenuating 
circumstances, as shown infra Section 37 b, the ac- · 
count becomes an account stated. 
"Failure to object to an account does not, as 
against the party to whom it was presented, con-
clusively establish its character as an 'account 
stated, but merely rais~s a presumption to that 
effect, and his conduct ther_ein is open to explana-
tion. 
'"The presumption of assent to the correctness 
of an -acc_ount retained without objection may be 
rebutted ·by showing facts inconsistent with it or 
tending to negative assent, as by showing that the 
party to who1n it was rendered was ill or absent 
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from home, that he had no opportunity to examine 
the account, that he was waiting for a more de-
tailed account vvhich he had requested or which had 
been promised him, that he had no knowledge of 
his interests in the matters contained in the ac-
count, that he expected sho~rtly to see the other 
party and make his objections in person, or that 
the expected meeting was prevented or delayed by 
some unforeseen casualty. So the natural infer-
ence to be drawn from an omission to object might . 
be rebutted by a showing that the parties were in 
litigation with reference to the matter when the 
account was rendered or within a short time there· 
after, that they had agreed to determine the 
amount at a later time, or had agreed expressly 
or by course of dealing that no technical defaults 
should be insisted upon. 
"Failure to object to the statement of an ac-
count may be explained by a showing that there 
had been an acquiescence in a previous, different 
statement involving the same transactions, or that 
the parties had already come, to a disagreement 
when the account was rendered, as where the party 
sought to be charged had protested at his first op-
portunity and the account was never corrected, or 
where there had been a previous dis-claimer of all 
liability on the account. So, where previous pro-
tests had gone unheeded and nothing more could 
be done except break a contract, which would en-
tail great financial risk, failure to make further 
protests cannot be interpreted as assent." 
In 1 C.J.S., section 65, page 754 
"In an action on an account stated questions 
of fact should ordinarily be submitted to the jury. 
Thus, where a settlen1ent of dates names, and 
figures so arranged as not to ·be self-explanatory, 
10 
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the question· as to whether a particular transac-
tion is included therein is for the jury; but where 
it contains no 'vords of doubtful meaning the con-
struction of the stated account is a matte-r of law 
for the court. 
"Where the facts are undisputed, the question 
as to whether an account was stated is for the 
court, as where the statement is e·videnced wholly 
by correspondence; but where the evidence is con-
flicting the question must be determined by the 
jury under proper instructions. 
hUnder the rule that an account rendered and 
retained for an unreasonable time without objec-
tion becomes an account stated, the authorities . 
are in apparent conflict as to whether the question 
·of what constitutes a reasonable time should be 
determined by the court as a matter of law or by 
the jury as a 1natter of fact. In some jurisdictions 
it is held that when the facts ·are clear the ques-
tion of the length of time deemed reasonable is de-
terminable by the court as a matter of law and that 
where the evidence is not clear, or conflict app·ears 
therein, the facts should be submitted to the jury 
under appropriate instructions. In other jurisdic-
tions, however, it is held that \vhat is a reasonable 
tin1e, whether the failure to object was for such 
length of time as would warrant an inference of 
assent, and whether the person to whom an account 
is rendered ought sooner to have discovered the 
errors therein, are questions of fact for the jury. 
"vVhere defendants made their objections to a 
person falsely claiming to represent plaintiff, it is 
a question of fact whether under the circumstances 
any inference of assent could be drawn from his 
failure to object to plaintiff." 
It is evident that further protest regarding the state-
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ment in question to Mr. Borsum or Mr. Williams would 
. he an idle je-sture by him. Mr. Scoville was relegated to 
the position of making protests to persons higher in the 
. hierarchy of the Company. Protests to the person render-
ing the statement should be sufficient. In this case it was 
enclosed in the letter from Mr. Williams dated January 
30, 19.50. There was evidence that protests regarding the 
. credits to Mr. Williams account were made. Evidence of 
these protests should have gone to the jury for their 
consideration. As excuse for any further protest by Mr. 
Scoville at the time or subsequent to receipt of any ac-
count receive·d by Mr. Scoville. 
Evidence of the protests to Williams and Borsum 
about the 1949 writing, the illness of Mr. Scoville early in 
1950, and the loss of employment by Mr. Scoville should 
have gone to jury as evidence or rebuttal of the presump-
tion of accuracy, if any such presumption arose. 
It was error· for the trial to direct a verdict for the 
Company on the ground of account stated, there being 
sufficient evidence to establish that protest was made 
·within a reasonable time and sufficient evidence to rebut 
any presumption that might have arisen. 
II. 
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PAYMENT 
OF AN AMOUNT ADMITTED TO BE DUE WAS MADE UPON 
THE CONDITION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH PAY-
MENT SHOULD BE IN FULL SATISFACTION OF ALL 
CLAIMS, IT WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE 
PARTY RELYING UPON PURPORTED ACCORD AND SATIS-
FACTION AS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION ON A CON-
TRACT. 
Mr. Scoville testified as to protests made about the 
12 
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1949 'vriting ( R. 28, 61, 62, 71, and 72). He also testified 
as to a conversation dpring which ~fr. Borsum stated that 
he should go along with the 1949 'vriting or that Mr. 
&oville, Mr. \'V"illian1s and Mr. Borsum would lose tll.eir 
jobs. There was no evidence regarding any conversations 
or circumstances showing any intent to settle a disputed 
claim. In Januaryl1950, the Company enclosed a check in 
a letter stating that the check was "to cover a Bonus for 
the year 1949." This check was returned by Mr. Scoville 
for the purpose of having withholding taxes deducted. 
Another check was sent to him in the sum equal to the 
first check less the withholding taxes. ·There is no state-
ment on the check regarding it being in settlemeut of all 
the claims Mr. Scoville had against the Company. This 
would not establish a defense o£ accord and satisfaction. 
The payment of an amount conceded to be due is not suffi-
cient consideration upon which to found a contract of ac-
cord and satisfaction. The payment of a sum conceded to 
be due upon the consideration that, if accepted it shall 
be in full settlement of the claim, may be sufficient con-
sideration, but no such condition was made. The conver-
sations, the check or the statement setting out ,a figure as 
''Bonus" equal to the amount of the first check do not in 
anyway establish a condition. 
The last check was enclose·d in a letter stating "At-
tached find check in the amount of $1,026.88 rep-resenting 
balance due on your Bonus for 1949." The check itself did 
not have any condition as to acceptance written on it. 
The mere statement "balance due on your Bonus for 
.1949" is not a statement of condit~on that the. check is 
... . , . ' 
13 
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tendered upon the condition that, if accepted, such accept-
ance is in full settlement of all claims for bonus for the 
year 1949. The statement is more indicative of an intent 
to show that such sum represents the credits in favor of 
Mr. 'Scoville in his account and makes no indication of 
condition of settlement. 
There .is no evidence upon which a contract of accord 
and satisfaction could be founded. 
The trial court having directed a verdict, the facts 
must be considered and applied in the most favorable 
light to the plaintiff's cause of action. 
In RALPH A. BADGER & CO. v. FIDELITY 
BUILDING & LOAN ASS'N., (Utah, 1938) 75 Pac. 2nd. 
669, 94 Utah 97, the court at page 676 quotes with ap-
. proval1 Am. Jur. page 217, section 4, that: · 
"The discharge of claims by way of Accord 
and Satisfaction is dependent upon a contract ex-
press or implied; and· it follows that the essentials 
necessary to valid con tracts generally must be 
present in a contract of Accord and Satisfaction. 
Therefore, the following elements are essential: 
(1) a proper subject matter, (2) competent par-
ties, ( 3) an assent or n1eeting of the minds of the 
parties, and ( 4) a consideration. 
"To the same effect see 1 C.J.S., Accord and 
Satisfaction, page 469, section 3 (a). This court 
in a number of cases has followed the rule thus 
enunciated: SMOOT v. CHECKETTS, 41 Utah 
211, 125 P. 412, Ann. Cas. 1915c,- 1113; ROHWER 
v. BURRELL, 42 Utah 510, 134 P. 573; GRAY v. 
BULLEN, 50 Utah 270, 167 P. 683; ASHTON v. 
SKEEN, 85 Utah 489, 39 P. 2d 1073; STJLLIVAN 
v. BENEFICIAL LIFE INS. CO., Utah, 64 P. 2d 
lJ 
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351; BROWNING v. EQUITABLE LIFE AS-
SUR. SOC. OF U.S·., Utah, 72 P. 2d 1060, 1068. 
In the case last cited 've said: 'An Accord is an 
agreement between parties, one to give or per-
fornl, the other to receive or accept, such agreed 
payment or perfor1nance in satisfaction of a claim. 
The '"satisfaction" is the consummation of such 
agreement. There n1ust be consideration for the 
agreement. Settlement of an unliquidated or dis-
puted clai1n "There the parties are apart in good 
faith presents such consideration. Where the claim 
is definite and no dispute but an admittance of its 
owing, the agreen1ent to take a lesser amount even 
followed by satisfaction is not good unless attend-
ed by some consideration." 
In SULLIVAN v. BENEFICIAL LIFE INS.UR-
ANCE C01IP ANY, (Utah, 1937), 94 Utah 532, 64 Pac. 
2nd. 351, the defendant asserted accord and satisfaction 
was established by a letter returning a premium and the 
check enclosed therewith in which this court held that 
there is nothing in the correspondence or the check itself 
or in the attitude of the ·defendant company to show any 
intent or attempt to settle a disputed claim. 
In BROWNING v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. 
SOC. OF THE U.S. (Utah, 1937), 72 Pac. 2nd. 1060, 94 
Utah 532, plaintiff brought an action to recover the dif-
ference between payments made unde·r an insurance 
policy for partial and total disabilities which were paid 
in full by the defendant. Defendant relied upon the ac-
cord and satisfaction as a defense. This honorable court 
held there was no accord and satisfaction, that payment 
by the company was merely the payment' of an amouut 
15 
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less than was o~ed, there being no dispute as to the 
amount of the claim. That the plaintiff's claim was 
merely for less than was actually due. 
In BELL v. JONES (Utah, 1941), 110 Pac. 2nd. 327, 
100 Utah 87, where an agreement provided that ·$150 be 
accep~eq. "in full satisfaction of the existing obligation of 
$400." And ~here was nothing stated that the $400 obliga-
tion was the only obligation existing between the parties. 
This honorable court held there was no indication of an 
intent to release any other obligation due upon the pay-
ment of $150 other than the payment of the obligation 
of $400. 
In AS.HTON v. SKEEN et al, (Utah, 1935), 39 Pac. 
2rid. 1073, 85 Utah 489, the matter was disposed of on 
grounds that acc6rd and satisfaction did not apply be-
,cause. of_ tl?-e atto~ney-client relationship. The ·court 
through l1:r. Justice Wade stated at page 1077 regarding 
cases set out in the opinion in that case : 
'"l.,hese cases generally lay down the rule that, 
-where there is an unliql.1idated claim or a bona 
fide dispute, the tender of a sum less than clairued, 
on -condition that, if accepted, it will be in full 
satisfaction of the greater claim, arnounts to an 
Accord and Satisfaction. A nurnber of these cases 
hold that, \vhere a personal check is tendered on 
the condition) if cashed, it will be in full satisfac-
tion of the disputed clairn, and the party receiving 
it cashes it and at the san1e time or later notifies 
the sender that it is only applied on account, it can 
only be accepted on the saine conditions as it is 
tendered, and, as a rnatter of law, amounts to an 
_ accord ~nd_ s~tisfaction." (Italics _added.) _ 
The Company raised the d-efense 0f accord and satis-
16 
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faction. The Company had the burden of establishing all 
of the elements of a contract of accord and satisfaction. 
As the case was disp·osed of upon a 1notion for a directed 
verdict all of the evidence must be considered and ap·plied 
in the most favorable light to the plaintiff and if there is 
any substantial evidence upon which the jury could find 
for the plaintiff under the pleadings the trial court must 
submit the issue to the jury and cannot direct a verdict. 
Under the rule as announced by this honorable court, 
the facts must establish (1) that the claim was unliqui-
dated or that a bona fide dispute existed between Mr. 
Scoville and the company; (2) that the Company agree to 
give in payment of the claim and that Mr. Scoville agree 
to accept a payment in satisfaction of the claim; (3) that 
such payment was made and accepted in satisfaction of 
the claim. 
In this case there was no accord and satisfaction 
bet,veen Mr. Scoville and the Company. There is no evi-
dence in the record which would substantiate an agree-
ment of payment and the acceptance of that payment as 
being in full satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's claim for 
credits due his account computed at the rate of $2 per 
ton feed sold. Nor is there any evidence that there was 
any pa:yinent made upon the condition that it be accepted 
as full satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's claim. 
The Company attempts to rely upon rules regarding 
the tending of payment of an amount conceded to be due 
upon the condition that if accepted the payment would be 
in full satisfaction of all of the claims of Mr. Sco:ville. 
Such a condition ~jd not exist. There is no evidence to 
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support such a theory. There is no evidence in the record 
that the payments made to Mr. Scoville were made upon 
a condition that, if accepted, such payments would op-
erate· a.s a satisfaction of any claim that Mr. 'Scoville 
might have. Such payments were made under statements 
and circumstances indicating that they were mere pay-
ments of amounts conceded to be due. Mr. Scoville. Such 
payments will not establish accord and satisfaction. 
The Company relies upon the case of CALIFORNIA 
BEAN GROWERS' ASSOCIATION v. RINDGE LAND 
& NAVIGATION COMPANY, 248 Pac. 658, 47 A.L.R. 
904, (Cal., 1926). The wording in the letters relied upon 
to establish an accord and satisfaction read as follows: 
and: 
"We have pleasure in enclosing herewith our 
check No. 2525 for $22,744.73 representing a final 
settlement of the 1918 account, with the exception 
of two small lots which remain unsold; these were 
enumerated on a statement which we recently for~ 
warded to you." 
"This amount represents the final settlement 
on your 1918 account." 
The words used in the letters sent by the Company in 
this .case do not indicate the settlement of any claim as 
the words used in the California Bean Growers'· case, 
Supra. The words used in the letter of January 30, 1950, 
were "Please find enclosed our check in the amount of 
$3544.35 to cover Bonus for the year 1949." 
The words used in the letter of April 25, 1950, sent 
by Mr. Borsum are "Attached find check in the amount 
of $1,026.88 representing balance ~ue on your bonus fo1: 
.18 
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1949. ~, These 'Yords do not indicate that there is a settle-
ment of any claim; nor is there any testimony which 
would even indicate that at the time of the letters it was 
'vithin the conten1plation of the parties that a settlement 
or compromise of a claim 'vas intended. 
The checks received and endorsed by Mr. Scoville 
did not indicate that they were sent in settlement of a 
claim. 
The Company in its brief states that in WALLACE 
v. CRAWFORD, 69 Pac. 2nd. 455 (Cal., 1937), "Where an 
accounting on rice payments was sent and received and 
showed the amount sold to defendant by plaintiff together 
with a check for that amount.· It was held that such con-
stituted an account stated and accord and satisfaction:" 
(Respondent's Brief page 37). 
Such statement is incorrect. In that case the court 
at page 461 said : 
· "Since the court failed to adopt findings re-
garding the question of a stated account and with 
respect to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, 
"\Ve shall not attempt to determine whether the con-
duct of the parties under all the circumstances of 
this case deterrninese this action adversely to the 
appellant on those issues. We are of the opinion 
it is unnecessary to do so." 
In HANSEN v. F'RESNO JER'SEY FARM DAIRY 
CO., 31 Pac. 2nd. 359, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into an agreement under ~he terms of which the plaintiff 
was to sell and deliver to the defendant so many gallons 
of milk per day at an agreed price. The defendant, each 
n1onth sent to the plaintiff a statement of milk delivered 
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during the preceding month acco1npanied by a chech 
covering the amount shown to be due by the statement, 
but which amount was subject to certain deductions made 
by the defendant. The amount in the statement was less 
than the agreed price and allowable deductions. The 
plaintiff retained the proceeds from the checks. Plaintiff 
protested the reductions to the defendant and Dairymans 
League. The defendant alleged an account stated upon 
each of the accounts defendant had rendered and paid to 
the plain tiff of the con tract. 
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of California held 
that in view of the protest made by the plaintiff and in 
view of the contractual relationship between the parties 
and the requirement for monthly accounts and payments 
such court could not say that the trial court'was not justi-
fied in concluding that there was no assent on the part of 
the plaintiff to the accuracy of the account. The court 
held that assuming the question in accord and satisfac-
tion was raised. This court did not feel justified in dis-
turbing the trial court's conclusion that there was no 
accord and satisfaction. 
In 1 California Juris prudence p. 134, section 10, it is 
said: 
"The great weight· of authority in American 
courts undoubtedly supports the rule that 'vhere 
the amount due is in dispute and a check for an 
arnount less than that clairned is sent to the credi-
tor with a statement that it is sent in full satisfac-
. tion of the clairn, and the tender is accornplished 
by such acts or decla.ra.tions as amount to a condi-
tion tha.t if the check is accepted at all it is ac-
cepted in full satisfaction of the disputed rlain1, 
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and the creditor so understands, its acceptance by 
the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction, 
even though the creditor states at the time that the· 
an1ount tendered is not accepted in full satisfac-
tion." (Italics added.) 
In 1 Am. Jur., pp. 225-6, section 24 of the chapter 
on Accord and satisfaction, it is said : 
"The creditor to whom a check is sent or other 
remittance made as payment in full has the <>'ption 
either of accepting it on the conditions on which it 
is sent, or of rejecting it. When a cla.im is in dis-
put(}, and the debtor sends to his creditor a check 
or other remittance which he clea.rly states is in 
full pay1n ent of the claim and the creditor accepts 
the rentittance or collects the check without objec-
tion it is generally recognized that this constitutes 
a good accord and satisfaction. The moment the 
creditor endorses and collects the check, with 
knowle_dge that it was o If ered only upon condition, 
he thereby agrees to the condition and is estopped 
from denying such agreement. It is then that the 
minds of the parties meet and the contract of ac-
cord and satisfaction becomes complete. It is not 
necessary that it be shown that the creditor knows 
the legal ·effect of his acceptance of the· check, 
as the mere acceptance will be regarded as as-
sent." (Italics added.) 
It should be noted that according to the above au-
thorities the payment must be sent to the creditor with 
a statement that it is sent in "full satisfaction of the 
clahn" or that such tender of payment must be accom-
plished by such actions or declarations as to amount, to 
a condition that if the check is accepted it is accepted in 
full satisfaction and that the creditor must so understand 
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that the acceptance by him constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction. These conditions do not exist in this case. 
The words used by the Company do not establish that 
they are tendered in full satisfaction by all the claims of 
Mr. S.coville against the Company. The words of condi-
tion cannot be read into the letters in which the checks 
were transmitted, and there was no statement of condi-
tion set out on the checks. 
In KRUGER v. GEER, (Supreme Court of New 
York, Appellate Term, 1899), 56 N.Y. Supp. 1015, plain-
tiff brought an action to recover balance due on collec-
tion of judgment. Defendant as attorney for the plain-
tiff collected a judgment of which the defendant was 
admittedly entitled to $372.62. Defendant sent plaintiff 
$168.86, retaining the balance for services rendered, as 
he claims, in other matters. Accompanying the check 
was a receipted statement ·and a letter. The material 
part of the letter stated: "Enclosed you/will find a state-
ment of account, my receipted bill for professional serv-
ices since our last settlement, and a check for $166.86, 
being the balance due you." The check did not make any 
declaration, or even indication, that it was intended as 
full settlement. Upon receipt of the letter the plaintiff 
complained to the defendant. The testimony was conflict-
. ing a.s to~whether the defendant stated to the plaintiff that 
he could retain the check as full settlement or return it to 
the defendant at the tin1e the plaintiff complained to the 
defendant. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff and 
defendant appealed the Supreme Court of New York 
held that the verdict of the jury resolved the conflicting 
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testimony, and unless an implied agreement can be in-
ferred from the conceded facts, there was no accord and 
satisfaction. At page 1016 et seq the Court said: 
"The only fart fro1n which such an inference 
could be dra\Yn is -the retention by the plaintiff of 
the receipted staten1ent, and of a cheek which was 
not coupled \Yith any condition that it should be 
received in full pa~'Jnent. That isolated fact is in-
sufficient to meet the requiren1ents of an accord, 
and, in connection \vith the surrounding circum-
stances, strips the defense of all merit." 
In INGR~L\.~I v. SAUSET et al, (Supreme Court of 
Washington, 1922), 209 Pac. 699, defendant mailed p·ur-
ported statement to the plaintiff which was itemized and 
set out the words "Balance due- $232.16." and enclosed 
a check in the sum admitted by the statement to be due. 
Plaintiff testified that he had the idea from the statement 
that the defendant intended that the check should be pay-
ment in full. The Supreme Court of Washington held that 
whatever the intention was the check was not offered ih 
full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. Though the de-
fendant hoped it would be so accepted. 
In LONG v. NEW ENGLAND SECURITIES· CO., 
'Springfield Court of Appeals, 1927, 297 SW 715, the 
plaintiff brought an action to recover the balance due 
on a commission having received checks enclosed in a 
letter stating: "And we enclose herewith check $225 and 
$360, respectively, in payment of your commission." The 
court held the letter and checks did not constitute an offer 
in full satisfaction of the claim of the creditor. 
In 34 A.L.R. at page 1052, the editors state: 
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"When the assent of the creditor is sought to 
be inferred from the acceptance of a less sum than 
that claimed to be due, the fact that such amount 
is offered irn full discharge of the whole claim must 
have been com.municated to the cred.itor in some 
unmistakable manner." 
Mere payment of an amount admittedly due on a 
claim for a greater sum is not sufficient consideration 
for a contract of accord and satisfaction of the greater 
claim. As set out by the foregoing authorities the pay-
ment of the amount admittedly due must be made upon 
the condition that payment and the acceptance of such 
payment is in full satisfaction of the claim. Such condi-
tion must be communicated to the person to whom tender 
is made in some unmistakable manner. The Company did 
I 
not tender any payments. upon condition that acceptance 
be made as satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's entire claim. 
Mere use of the terms "balance due," or a check accom-
panie:d by a statement setting out a sum. equal to that of 
a check reciting that the sum is "Bonus" is not enough. 
It would be .error for the trial court to direct a ve-r-
dict for the Company on the ground that there was an ac-
cord and satisfaction. 
III. 
WI-IERE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE 
TO WRITING PURPORTED_ TO BE CONTRACT,, AND ELE-
ME!~TS OF ESTOPPEL WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE, IT WAS 
ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELYING 
UPON ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT THE CONTRACT OF THE 
OTI-IER PARTY. 
The primary duty of Mr. Scoville was the sale of 
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feed sold by the Con1pany. The great bulk of the feed sold 
by Mr. Scoville "\Vas sold under a turkey finance program .. 
The feed was sold under contracts entered into by the 
Company and the turkey raisers. The contracts were 
entered into and approved by the Company by July 1, 
1949. The sales of the Company had been contracted for 
and the primary purpose of Mr. Scoville's employment 
had been served. During the latter part of July or early 
August the Company attempts to assert a writing as 
the contract bet,veen Mr. Scoville and the Company. 
There is sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict that 
Mr. Scoville protested to Mr. Williams who signed the 
Bulletin setting out the bonus plan for 1948, and to Mr. 
Borsum who signed the writing upon which the Company 
relies to establish a contract for the year 1949. 
The last protest to Mr. Williams or Mr. Borsum was 
made on January 10, 1950. It is apparent that further 
protest to these gentlemen would he futile. At this point 
in so far as the year 1949 is concerned a debtor creditor 
relationship existed. It cannot be said that there was a 
further continuance of any agreement of the year of 1949. 
At this point Mr. Scoville was entitled to rely upon his 
re1nedies as a creditor. 
There was sufficient evidence to support a verdict 
that timely objection was made, tha.t there was no con-
tinuation of performance under the purported contract 
between Mr. Scoville and the Company. 
There is no evidence, in fact every fact is to the con-
trary, that there was an acceptance of benefits and an 
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Nor is there any evidence that there was any nlisrep. 
resentation by Mr. Scoville upon which the Company 
relied to their detriment. 
It was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for 
the Company on the ground that there was an estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Scoville's theory of the case, that a contract im-
plied in fact and in law arose in January, 1949, to the ef-
fect that a $2.00 per ton of feed sold be c~edited to his ac-
count during the year 1949, should have gone to the jury. 
There was sufficient evidence, when considered in the 
most favorable light for Mr. Scoville to require submis-
sion of the case to the jury. 
In addition to the evidence regarding an implied con-
tract in fact there was a presumption giving rise to a con-
tract providing for $2.00 per ton of feed sold for the year, 
1949. The plan was based on annual production. His 
employment under the Company's plan was on a yearly 
basis. The continuation of Mr. 'Scoville in his employ-
ment in law and in fact created a new contract providing 
for the $2.00 per ton of feed sold credited to his account. 
There is no merit to the claim of the Company that 
they have affirmative defenses as a matter of la\v. 
There was sufficient evidence upon which to sustain 
a verdict by the jury that objection to the purported ac-
count rendered by the Cornpany was made by Mr. Sco-
ville within a reasonable time. There was also sufficient 
evidence to sustain a verdict by the jury that if objection 
was not made within a reasonable ti1ne, the presun1ption 
of accuracy of the account 'Yas rebutted. 
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There is no evidence that payment by the Company 
of 1949 bonus checks were made upon the condition that 
acceptance would be· in full satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's 
claim in support of the Company's theory of accord and 
satisfaction. 
The case is not a proper case for -the application 
of the concept of estoppel. Protest regarding the 1949 
writing was made and there was no contradiction of the 
evidence. The Company did not change its position to 
its detriment. There is no evidence of misrepresentation 
or reliance. The Company attempted to foist a writing 
upon ~Ir. Scoville as being the agreement of the parties. 
Such writing was not the contract of the parties. Mr. Sco-
ville is not estopped to assert the true agreement of the 
parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR. 
REESE C. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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